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25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT TRILOGY:
REFLECTIONS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SEATTLE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Keynote: Before and After the Summary Judgment
Trilogy
Remarks of Suja A. Thomas*
In this keynote speech for the Seattle University School of Law
Colloquium on the 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy:
Reflections on Summary Judgment, Professor Suja Thomas discusses
access to courts and juries before and after the summary judgment
trilogy. Following up on debate in the academic literature on the effect
of the trilogy on summary judgment, Professor Thomas explores
influences on the trilogy and influences of the trilogy outside of
summary judgment. She first describes Supreme Court decisions on
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, and the directed
verdict, which helped set the stage for the trilogy and which decreased
litigants' access to courts and juries. She then explores access after the
trilogy. Professor Thomas describes how access to courts and juries
continued to decline through the Supreme Court's decisions on
arbitration and the motion to dismiss. Professor Thomas gives all of
these procedures some context by showing their effect on one class of
factually intensive cases employment discrimination cases. She
concludes by introducing the concept of "the Other Branch" and states
that access to courts and juries can possibly increase if the jury is
viewed in this manner.
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Thank you to Professor Coleman for the invitation to speak here and
for the opportunity to spend the day with the distinguished group from
whom you will hear later today. Many of you are familiar with the
1986 trilogy of Supreme Court cases on summary judgment that we are
discussing in this Colloquium. Before I describe my thesis, which
focuses on the demise of the civil jury in the last seventy-five years and
also on the potential for the jury's rejuvenation, let me remind everyone
of the decisions. There were three cases, Matsushita v. Zenith,' decided
in March of 1986, and then Anderson v. Liberty Lobby 2 and Celotex v.
Catrett,3 decided in June of 1986.
In Matsushita, the plaintiff U.S. television companies alleged a
conspiracy among defendant Japanese firms to decrease the television
prices in the U.S. to drive the U.S. companies out of the U.S. market.4
The Supreme Court decided five to four that the plaintiffs had not
shown that the defendants had a rational motive to conspire. 5 Despite
the presence of evidence of a conspiracy, the Court decided that the
plaintiffs' claim was implausible, and without additional evidence,
summary judgment should be granted. 6
In the second case in the trilogy, Anderson, a group sued a magazine
for libel.7 In the past, the Court had decided that a public figure-here
the group-who sued for libel needed to prove actual malice with clear
and convincing evidence at trial, and the district court applied this
standard on summary judgment in Anderson.8 With three justices in
dissent, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that this clear
and convincing standard should be applied on summary judgment. 9
Finally, in Celotex, perhaps the most prominent of the trilogy, the
plaintiff, whose husband had died from exposure to asbestos, alleged
that her husband was exposed to asbestos manufactured by the
defendant. 10 The Supreme Court decided, again, with three dissenters,
that the party moving for summary judgment need not produce any
1. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
3. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
4. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577-78.
5. Id. at 588-97.
6. Id. at 588-98.
7. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 244-45.
8. Id. at 246-47.
9. Id. at 242.
10. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986).
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affirmative evidence-in this case, evidence to negate exposure to
asbestos.I
The trilogy of summary judgment cases is often said to have had a
profound effect on the use of summary judgment and thus, a significant
effect on civil litigation, decreasing the number of trials and also thus
decreasing the use of juries.12 There is disagreement about this effect of
the trilogy, and I will talk more about this later. Regardless of the result
of this debate, I am going to argue that prior to the trilogy significant
change for civil litigation had already been set in motion by Supreme
Court decisions regarding other civil motions, and those prior decisions
lead to the acceptability of the jurisprudence in the trilogy. I am also
going to argue that the trilogy made other significant changes in civil
litigation acceptable, including the enforceability of arbitration clauses
and the change in the motion to dismiss standard that we see today.
And finally, I am going to argue that the most significant effect of this
last seventy-five years of Supreme Court case law regarding procedure
is the decrease in the use of the jury trial in civil cases. While I will not
be able to prove all of these relationships in this brief speech, I will
show that the trend of this change toward decision making by judges
and lawyers and away from juries is remarkable and unmistakable.
In conjunction with discussing the effect of these procedures on the
jury trial, I want to talk about two current phenomena in the American
legal system. One, many individuals do not have their civil disputes
resolved. And two, when disputes are resolved, often they are not
resolved by laypeople. I want to start first by showing these
phenomena; second, showing that these phenomena often occur in
specific types of factually intensive cases including employment
discrimination; third, demonstrate why these phenomena are
problematic; and fourth, suggest an approach to change them-which
argues for thinking about the jury in another way-as "the other
branch."
To illustrate the phenomenon that many individuals do not have their
civil disputes resolved, I am going to tell you a story-a story that
illustrates the problems that many of us have with our legal system. My
husband and I decided to build a house a year and a half ago. Yes, this
was a bad idea right there. The builder presented us with a contract
with an arbitration clause, which required three arbitrators. I have never
been a big fan of arbitration. I would rather have a group of regular
11. Id. at 317.
12. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (1998).
501
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
people hear my case than a group of lawyers. And I certainly do not
want to pay them when I can have my case heard basically for free in
court. However, we signed the contract with an arbitration clause. I
will skip all of the gory-and they were gory-details, but finally eight
and a half months later, we moved into our house. Six weeks after
move-in, the sewer backed up right onto our new floors. We had a
warranty so it should be fixed, right? It was not. The builder thought
we should kick in fifty percent to have a working sewer. And then,
there was the arbitration clause. The clause required, as I said, three
arbitrators. If we could not agree on the rules, the default arbitration
rules required us to pay around $4000 simply to file a complaint without
even taking into account the cost of the three arbitrators, and this was all
for a dispute involving $5600.13 1 am a lawyer licensed to practice in
Illinois so I could research the issues for free and meet with the
builder's lawyer. After a month of stress and drafting a complaint, the
builder agreed to fix the sewer.
For any nonlawyer, this would have been a disaster. The person
would have had to pay for at least part of the fix despite the warranty,
because the cost of a lawyer and arbitration to fight this would not have
made any sense. Everyone-lawyer, nonlawyer-has at least one story
like this-probably many-of a problem perhaps with the cable
company or a telephone company. Many times, now, the cost of trying
to fix an issue is higher than what the damages actually are because of
things like attorneys' fees and arbitration costs. As a result, many
people are being prevented from pursuing their disputes.
A recent Supreme Court case, AT&T v. Concepcion,14 illustrates this
problem even more. The Concepcions had a thirty-dollar dispute with
AT&T over their cell phone bill.15 Their "contract" with AT&T
required arbitration and did not permit class actions.16  However,
California law found such arbitration clauses prohibiting class actions
unconscionable. 17 Reviewing the case, in a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court said that federal law encouraging arbitration preempted
California law so it was okay for the parties to contract around class
13. A good argument could be made that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. For an
interesting discussion of quality issues with alternative dispute resolution, including the
possibility that substantive law may be compromised, see Edward Brunet, Questioning the
Quality ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1987).
14. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
15. Id. at 1744.
16. Id. at 1744-45.
17. Id. at 1746.
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actions.18 As an aside, according to the agreement, the Concepcions
could have pursued their individual claim in small claims court, but the
filing fee would have been higher than the amount that they were
claiming that AT&T owed them. 19
The Concepcion case makes clear that people will be unable to fight
small-which sometimes may not be so small to them-claims, because
lawyers cannot take these cases. The $30 claim of the Concepcions was
one such case, but you could easily see that inappropriate charges even
in the range of $500 or more would not be cost effective for lawyers to
take. In the meantime, the Concepcions may have their service cut off
and/or their credit rating affected while they attempt to fight, and
possibly cannot for cost reasons, an inappropriate charge. So this is the
first phenomenon-that many individuals are being prevented from
resolving their disputes.
I will add that Professor Coleman, in her work on the "vanishing
plaintiff," takes on a related issue. 20  She has posed the interesting
question of what would have happened if cases that made important
substantive law changes had instead been kicked out of court on
procedure-like a motion for summary judgment or a motion to
dismiss. The question is where would we be in terms of our substantive
law.21 You will hear more about this from Professor Coleman on the
panel.
Now, to the second phenomenon-that disputes that are actually
resolved often are not resolved by laypeople. Currently, only
approximately one percent of civil cases are tried in court by juries.22
Summary judgment, 23 the directed verdict,24 the motion to dismiss,25
and arbitration26 all contribute to the disuse of the jury, and judgment as
18. Id. at 1748 53.
19. Id. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20. Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff 42 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
[hereinafter Coleman. Vanishing Plaintifj]. available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908359
Brooke D. Coleman, What If: A Study of Seminal Cases as if Decided Under a Twombly/Iqbal
Regime, 90 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Coleman, What If], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916832.
21. Coleman, Vanishing Plaintiff supra note 20; Coleman, What If supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The One Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years
War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255. 1259 (2005).
23. FED .R. Civ. P. 56.
24. FED .R. Civ. P. 50.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
26. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
503
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
a matter of law 27 and remittitur28 are procedures used to second guess
juries.
Summary judgment is the most prominent example. Under summary
judgment, a judge decides to dismiss a case when she decides the
evidence is insufficient, or a reasonable jury could not find for the
nonmoving party.29  As I previously stated, the summary judgment
trilogy is often the focus of why federal courts now try many fewer
cases. Judge Wald and many others have said that the trilogy gave the
signal to the federal courts to grant more summary judgments, thus
kicking cases out before juries tried them. 30 While there is empirical
disagreement about whether the trilogy itself actually caused an increase
in summary judgments31-and you will hear more from Professor
Mullenix about the effect or noneffect of the trilogy 32 -there is at least
agreement that judges often (at least in certain types of cases) use the
device of summary judgment to dismiss cases. 33
Today, I am asserting that this jurisprudence away from juries began
outside of summary judgment and before the trilogy. Also this
jurisprudence has continued past the trilogy to the present day. Let me
start at the place I consider the beginning of this jurisprudence, which
was fifty years earlier than the trilogy, in 1935, in a case called
Baltimore v. Redman.34 In that case, the jury rendered a verdict against
the defendant for negligence. 35 The court of appeals reversed the jury's
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
29. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 12, at 1914-17.
31. Compare, e.g., Martin H. Redish. Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329. 1339 (2005) (decline in trials after
trilogy), and Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary
Judgment Burdens Twenty Years after the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 82, 86-88. 143-
44 (2006) (noting trilogy of cases on summary judgment cited more often than any other cases).
with Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 620-21 (2004)
(decline in trials earlier in the 1970s). and Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter Century of Summary
Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861 (2007)
(noting trilogy has not increased the grant of summary judgment to the extent scholars have
previously stated).
32. Linda Mullenix, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado
About Very Little, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561 (2012).
33. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL.. SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (3d ed.
2006): Redish. supra note 31, at 1339.
34. Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
35. Id. at 656.
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judgment and ordered a new trial. 36 The Supreme Court decided that a
court could decide that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient,
could find against the jury's verdict, and could find for the defendant,
eliminating the need for a new trial.37 The Court had already decided a
case called Dimick v. Schiedt that same year, where the Court decided
that a court could not add to a jury verdict but could reduce a jury
verdict.38
The Supreme Court followed up Redman almost ten years later with
Galloway v. United States in 1943.39 In that case, the plaintiff alleged
that he was disabled at the time when his insurance policy lapsed, and
thus that he was eligible for benefits under his policy.40 The Court
extended Redman to state that during a trial, upon a directed verdict, a
court could decide that the evidence was insufficient and take the case
away from the jury.41
Forty years after Galloway, in the trilogy, when the Supreme Court
compared the standard for summary judgment to the directed verdict,
the Court made acceptable a judge's evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence on a paper record.42 The trilogy made it acceptable, even at
times, desirable, for judges to dismiss cases, without a jury hearing any
evidence, and for that matter, without a judge hearing any live
evidence. 43
We see an extension of this concept of cases being decided without
juries-by non-laypeople-five years after the trilogy in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.44  There, an employer required an
employee to register with securities exchanges. 45 When the employee
filled out his registration application, he agreed to arbitrate any claims
that he had against the employer. 46  The employee sued for age
discrimination in court, and the Supreme Court decided that it was
acceptable for an employer to require an employee to give up his right
36. Id.
37. Id. at 656-61.
38. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
39. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
40. Id. at 372.
41. Id. at 388-96.
42. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242. 250 (1986).
43. Id.
44. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
45. Id. at 23.
46. Id.
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to bring a case against the employer for age discrimination in court.47
Unsurprisingly, ten years later in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the
Court decided that an employer could require a potential employee to
give up his right to litigate in courtjust to apply for a job.48
More recently, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly49 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,50 the Supreme Court made it easier for courts to dismiss a case
before any discovery was had, and the Court said that courts are to use
their judicial "experience and common sense" to decide whether to
dismiss a case. 51 The standard is whether the claim is "plausible,"52 a
standard that was used in Matsushita,53 one of the cases in the summary
judgment trilogy. As I have said in the past, the motion to dismiss is the
new summary judgment motion, 54 so we have come full circle to a point
since the trilogy that even at the motion to dismiss stage, judges make
judgments about the sufficiency of the facts.
I want to mention a final area where laypeople have a say but not the
final say. A judge can decide that damages rendered by a jury are
excessive, and the judge can remit or reduce those damages unless the
plaintiff agrees to try the case again.55 And Congress itself has set
damages caps on some types of claims that it has created. 56 In these
circumstances, Congress, not a jury, decides the maximum damages that
the jury can find.
So let me give these procedures some context. Many of these
procedures, including summary judgment, motions to dismiss,
remittitur, and arbitration, are used in everyday cases including factually
intensive cases that involve people's lives and jobs. The procedures are
used most often in certain categories of cases including employment
discrimination cases. Let me summarize how these procedures have
affected this category of cases.
47. Id. at 24-35.
48. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
49. Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
50. Ashcroft v. 1qbal. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
51. Id. at 1950.
52. Iqbal. 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
53. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 574, 587 (1986).
54. Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under
lqbal and Twombly. 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 15 (2010).
55. Hetzel v. Prince William Cnty.. 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998).
56. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) (setting caps on employment
discrimination claims).
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The Federal Judicial Center has found that summary judgment is
ordered more often in employment discrimination cases than most other
types of cases, with seventy-three percent granted in employment
discrimination cases in comparison to sixty percent granted in other
types of cases. 57 Now, we also see some effect, though somewhat
uncertain, of the motion to dismiss in these same types of cases. The
rules committees, including Judge Lee H. Rosenthal at the helm,58 were
interested in the effect of Iqbal and Twombly. Heeding this call, the
Federal Judicial Center, with help from Professor Gensler, 59 found,
among other results, a 5.6% increase in the percentage of motions to
dismiss granted with leave to amend in employment discrimination
cases.60 As the Federal Judicial Center has stated, more study is needed
to see whether cases dismissed with leave to amend are ultimately
dismissed.61 It is clear though that everyone is getting used to Iqbal and
Twombly, and lawyers may file more motions to dismiss in the future. 62
That is summary judgment and the motion to dismiss.
Remittitur-the reduction of jury verdicts by judges-also has had a
significant effect on employment discrimination. Some years ago, I did
57. Memorandum from Joe Cecil and George Cort to Hon. Michael Baylson 2, 6 tbl.3 (June
15. 2007). http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf.
58. Lee H. Rosenthal. The Summary Judgment Rule Changes that Weren't, 43 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 471 (2012).
59. Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment: We Need to Talk,
43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 517 (2012).
60. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS To DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER
IoBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878646. Other studies on the effect of Twombly and lqbal
have been conducted by Joseph Seiner, Kendall Hannon. Lonny Hoffman, and Patricia Hatamyar.
See, e.g., Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions. 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008); Patricia
W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?. 59 AM. U. L.
REv. 553 (2010); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact on
12(h)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's
Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED.
CTS. L. REV. I (2012); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases. 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 Joseph A. Seiner.
Pleading Disability. 51 B.C. L. REV. 95 (2010). For the most recent FJC study on Iqbal, see Joe
S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study Motions to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal (Mar. 19. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026103.
61. Cecil, supra note 60.
62. Cf Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (discussing that while Iqbal and Twombly are the law that will be applied in
all cases, they were odd factually-different than the vast majority of cases in federal court,
including employment discrimination cases).
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a study of remittitur. 63 In the study over ten years, I found that judges
ordered remittitur more often in civil rights cases, including
employment discrimination cases, than many other types of cases, with
sixty-three percent of the remitted cases in the last five years of the
study being civil rights cases. 64
In addition to summary judgment, the motion to dismiss, and
remittitur, arbitration has also caused a significant effect on
employment discrimination cases. The Supreme Court has decided
significant cases that support arbitration in the employment
discrimination context, and this is a continuing growing area of
arbitration. 65 Estimates state that more than one third of nonunion
employee/employer disputes are in arbitration as opposed to in court.66
Moreover, in a recent study, Professor Colvin found that plaintiffs had
less of a chance to win in arbitration than in court and won less damages
in arbitration than in court. 67 Part of the reason, the professor found,
was because employers and arbitrators are repeat players in
arbitration. 68 All of this shows that juries are having less of a chance to
decide certain types of cases, including employment discrimination
cases-some of the most factually intensive cases.
Thus far, I have asserted that many people do not have their everyday
disputes resolved, that often when they are resolved, they are resolved
by lawyers or judges instead of laypeople, and this happens particularly
in certain types of factually intensive cases including employment
discrimination cases. I think that all of this contravenes the right to a
jury trial that is set forth in the Seventh Amendment. 69 And in addition
to a constitutional problem, we have a social problem. It does not make
sense in our society to have one group of people deciding our disputes.
First, I want to say a few words about the constitutional problem. I
want to make an analogy to the game of telephone. Justice Brennan
actually did this in the Anderson case when he discussed the changing
63. Suja A. Thomas, Re-examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003).
64. Id. at 746.
65. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001): see, e.g., Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution
Clauses in High Stakes Employment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107 (2002)
(discussing arbitration in employment contracts with highly skilled employees).
66. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes
and Processes. 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1. 2 (2011).
67. Id. at 4-8.
68. Id. at 11-17.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
508 [Vol. 43
2012] Before and After the Summary Judgment Trilogy
standard for summary judgment,70 and I think this telephone analogy
also aptly applies to the changing right to a jury trial in civil cases. We
have all played the game of telephone. Someone gives one person a
message, and then, it gets repeated over and over. Pretty soon, the
message is not even close to what was first stated. In 1791, when the
Seventh Amendment was adopted, the message was a right to a jury
trial exists in civil cases. Now, the message has changed dramatically.
We can waive the jury trial right by simply wanting to apply for a job.
The Seventh Amendment provides "[in Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty-five dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law." 71 The Seventh Amendment
specifically refers to the common law, unlike any other part of the
Constitution. And the Supreme Court has said that common law in the
Seventh Amendment is the English common law in 1791, the date when
the Seventh Amendment was adopted. 72 As a result, the Court has said
that the right to a jury trial should be governed by the substance of the
English common law in 1791.73 With respect to the civil procedure
motions I have mentioned-summary judgment, the motion to dismiss,
the directed verdict, judgment as a matter of law, and remittitur-all of
these motions permit a judge to decide the sufficiency of the evidence
or facts.74 However, under the English common law in 1791, a court
could determine that the evidence was insufficient only after a jury trial,
and then, the court could send the case to a new trial.75 The court could
not decide to dismiss the case. There were no determinations of the
sufficiency of the evidence on paper records, and where there was a
determination that the evidence was insufficient, there was a new trial.
So I have stated in the past that these procedures of summary
70. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 264-65 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
72. See, e.g, Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1973); see also Parsons v. Bedford,
28 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1830): United States v. Wonson. 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
73. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750.
74. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (motion to dismiss); Anderson, 477
U.S. 242 (summary judgment); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (remittitur); Bait. &
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict):
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (directed verdict).
75. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 157-
58 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas. Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional]; Suja A. Thomas.
The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
687. 742 48 (2004).
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judgment,76  the motion to dismiss, 77  and remittitur78  are
unconstitutional, and by analogy so too are the directed verdict and
judgment as a matter of law.79
What I assert about these procedures is not radical despite how it
sounds. In Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., before this trend
away from the jury, the Supreme Court had recognized that pursuant to
the Seventh Amendment, a court could not dismiss a case if the court
thought the evidence was insufficient.80 There must be a new trial.81
Also, in the dissent in Galloway, Justice Black, with Justices Douglas
and Murphy joining, emphasized that the jury trial right was violated
when judges dismissed cases upon finding the evidence insufficient. 82
Moreover, in the trilogy, justices expressed concern about the violation
of the jury trial right. In Matsushita, the four dissenters stated that the
new standard invaded the factfinder's province. 83 And in Anderson,
Justice Brennan emphasized the impingement of the right to a jury trial,
because judges weighed evidence under the summary judgment
standard created in that case. 84  Thus, the Seventh Amendment is the
constitutional problem with judges and lawyers deciding our cases.
There is also a social problem with judges and lawyers deciding our
cases. Judges and lawyers do not represent the views of our society as a
whole. Judges and lawyers are not the people whom a lawyer would
choose to be on the jury. First, there is more diversity, including gender
and racial diversity, in the general population than in the judiciary and
in the lawyer population. And we know that diversity can affect
decision-making. For example, in their article in the Washington
University Law Review, Professors Chew and Kelley discussed how
judges viewed racial harassment cases differently based on their races.85
76. Thomas. Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, supra note 75.
77. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Ls Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1851 (2008).
78. Thomas, supra note 63. When a judge remits a verdict, she offers a new trial as an
alternative. However, the new trial is not a real choice, because the judge has already stated the
maximum amount a reasonable jury can find.
79. Cf Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, supra note 75, at 176-77
(comparing summary judgment. directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
80. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
8 1. Id.
82. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396-411 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
83. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598-607 (1986) (White,
J., dissenting).
84. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242. 257-68 (1986) (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
85. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis
of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009).
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Also, in their article in the Harvard Law Review, Professors Kahan,
Hoffman, and Braman discussed how our views of facts are shaped by
our experiences. 86  This article helps us realize, probably
unsurprisingly, that all of us can think differently about the same
occurrence; you will hear more about the Kahan article from Professor
Stempel.87
The second problem with judges and lawyers deciding our cases is
judges and lawyers are said to think differently than those with different
backgrounds. I would say just ask my non-lawyer husband, but we
have other evidence. Professor Daicoff summarized studies on judges,
lawyers, and laypeople, and these showed that judges and lawyers can
indeed think differently than laypeople.88
Finally, judges face some of the same difficulties that laypeople face
in evaluating evidence. Professor Robbennolt summarized studies
comparing decision making of juries and judges. While these showed
many similarities in the decision making of judges and juries, these also
showed that some of the same problems that affect juries affect
judges, 89 including, as an example, problems with ignoring inadmissible
evidence, a finding by Professors Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski. 90
Now, the response to all of this is cost. The response is that it is
necessary to kick out bad cases early, at summary judgment or the
motion to dismiss stage, or have arbitration-an alternative, cheaper
method of dispute resolution. The Supreme Court has talked about cost
in its decisions. It has discussed the cost of discovery, including the
possibility of companies being forced to settle bad cases to prevent the
costs of litigation, and the Court has discussed the cost of increased
caseloads to courts. 91 There certainly is a cost to bad cases. With the
general American rule of everyone pays their own way, in some ways it
does not seem fair to permit cases with no merit to proceed. Indeed, if
these cases are not thrown out early on, it would make sense, as the
86. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009).
87. Jeffrey W. Stempel. Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate
Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627 (2012).
88. SuSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
PERSONALITY TRAITS AND WEAKNESSES 25-49 (2004).
89. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for
Judging, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005).
90. See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323-24 (2005).
91. Bell AtL. Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 558-59. 567 n.12 (2007): Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
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Supreme Court said, for companies to settle these cases before they
incur the greater cost of trial.
The plaintiff too is engaging in a significant cost unless the lawyer
takes the case on a contingency fee basis. And putting aside attorneys'
fees, the plaintiff has to pay costs in any case that she loses.9 2 Thus,
there is cost to both sides of a bad case.
The question, then, is what properly incentivizes the parties. Courts
generally would say summary judgment for one. It is said that summary
judgment prevents trials from occurring, and summary judgment
encourages the settlement of cases before the procedure is used.93
Additionally, the grant or denial of summary judgment encourages the
settlement of cases. 94 The argument goes that without the possibility of
summary judgment, these cases would not settle and would go to trial.95
Also some contend that without summary judgment, lawyers would
bring more cases with weak evidence, because courts could not
eliminate these cases on summary judgment.96 Professor Brunet will
talk more about these incentives later on the panel.97
Despite these conventional views, it may be that the federal docket
would not be significantly affected by the elimination of summary
judgment.98 Parties would continue to settle, because they can lose at
trial.99 Also lawyers might not bring additional cases with weak
evidence, because they may not have the resources to bring such
cases. 100 Moreover, courts themselves could have less cost by not being
forced to review the inches, and many times, boxes of evidence in
support of motions for summary judgment, and instead going to trial
directly. 101
Regardless of these incentives, there is no cost exception to the jury
trial right. The jury was not the efficient choice of the founders. 102 it
was the choice of the founders. Period. Any attempt to merge
92. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
93. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, supra note 75, at 177.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Edward Brunet, The Efficiency ofSummary Judgment, 43 LOY.U. CHi. L.J. 689 (2012).
98. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, supra note 75, at 177-79.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g.. Suja A. Thomas. Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 767.
779-82 (2005).
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efficiency and the jury ignores the decision that the founders made-to
have a jury trial right.
The question, then, is how do we go back in time and recognize this
authority of the jury. I argue we need to think of the jury in another
way-a way that it has not been thought of. We need to treat the jury as
what I call "the other branch." I am going to limit my comments to the
civil jury today, but this concept also applies to the grand jury and the
criminal jury, and I am developing all of this in a book that I am
writing.103
I argue that the other constitutional actors, including the judiciary and
legislature, have not exercised sufficient restraint in relationship to the
jury.' 04 Instead of judges and the legislature limiting themselves to
their own power domains, judges and legislatures have encroached on
the authority of the jury.105 Think about it this way. Any time the
judiciary acts to limit the authority of the jury, it gives itself more
power.106 Thus when a judge decides a case on summary judgment, the
jury has less power, and the judge has more power, the judge being
permitted to decide the result in the case. 107 Any time the legislature
acts to limit the authority of the jury, it also gives itself more power.108
Thus when the legislature decides to limit the damages in a particular
type of case, the authority of the jury to decide the damages is
lessened. 109 Whenever the judiciary or legislature acts to take power
from the jury, then, it simultaneously gives itself power.' 1 In other
words, the judiciary and the legislature can compete with the jury for
power." This competition for authority is different than other
competition for authority, for example, between the states and the
103. SUJA A. THOMAS, THE OTHER BRANCH (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Thomas. THE OTHER BRANCH]; see also Thomas. supra note 102.
104. THOMAS, THE OTHER BRANCH. supra note 103. Prominent judges and scholars have
written about the shift of decision-making from juries to judges or legislatures. See, e.g., Paul D.
Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J.
597 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, The Pre-Trial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982 (2003); Jack Weinstein, The Role of Judges In a
Government of by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture. 30 CARDozo
L. REV. 1 (2008).
105. THOMAS, THE OTHER BRANCH, supra note 103.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
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federal government.1 2 If the Supreme Court decides that states cannot
legislate in a certain way regarding abortion, states can continue to
legislate to further their policy objectives. 113 The jury, on the other
hand, is in a particularly perilous position with no ability to protect its
own authority.11 4 If authority is taken from the jury, the jury cannot
recover this authority." 5
With this type of imbalance, the question is how the jury trial right
can be maintained. 116 A reason that the jury's authority has been
improperly restricted is that the jury has never been considered an
essential part of the constitutional structure like the other constitutional
actors, including the judiciary and the legislature.11 7 It has been at best
been considered a subordinate to the judicial branch.' 18 Despite this
assumed lower position in the Constitution, the jury occupies as
significant of a position as any constitutional actor having specific
authority.119  In order to give effect to this authority, the other
constitutional actors must recognize the jury in its proper position as the
other branch. 120 And because of the position of the jury-as unable to
protect its own authority-the judiciary and the legislature must act
with what I term structural modesty.121 What this means is that the
other branches must narrowly interpret their own power in relationship
to the jury's competing power using the text of the Constitution. 122 And
I argue that this means that they must use the English common law. 123
So you might ask why the English common law and not an evolving
common law as nonoriginalists would encourage? This is a place where
the Founders believed originalism was necessary.124 If judges could
decide to dismiss cases whenever they wanted under an evolving
common law, then jury authority would be meaningless.1 25 The English
common law gives a set point in time at which to evaluate the propriety
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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of procedures.1 26  The English common law was developed and
consistent, and Justice Story recognized that the Founders intended
common law in the Seventh Amendment to be the English common
law. 127
Thus, I argue that the judiciary and the legislature should act with
structural modesty using the English common law when they interpret
their own power in relationship to the authority of the jury.128 What
this means, for example, is that the judiciary would act with structural
modesty when it looks at summary judgment and see that summary
judgment and nothing like it existed under the common law and thus
that the judiciary cannot use this procedure to take a case from a jury. 129
If the judiciary and the legislature can recognize the jury in this role
as the other branch, the jury right, with juries in only approximately one
percent of civil cases, can change. More individuals can have their
cases heard in the first instance and have them heard by juries in the
second instance. We will be closer to what the founders envisioned,
and members of our society can participate in deciding how our society
is to function on a day to day basis. In this world, the Concepcions
would be able to resolve their dispute and have it determined by a jury,
and you will too.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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